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Abstract
It has been suggested that the algebraic structure of AES (and other similar block
ciphers) could lead to a weakness exploitable in new attacks. In this paper, we use
the algebraic structure of AES-like ciphers to construct a novel cipher embedding
where the ciphers may lose their non-linearity. We show some examples and we
discuss the limitations of our approach.
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Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [Nat01] is nowadays the most
widespread block cipher in commercial applications. It represents the state-
of-art in block cipher design and provides an unparalleled level of assurance
against all known cryptanalytic techniques, except for its round-reduced ver-
sions. It is true that AES (and other modern block ciphers) presents a highly
algebraic structure, leading researchers to exploit it for new algebraic attacks,
but these tries have been unsuccessful as yet (except for academic reduced
versions).
The best that one can hope for a cryptosystem is that all its encryption
functions behave in unpredictable way (close to random), in particular we
would like that it behaves in a way totally different from linear or affine maps.
A sign of strength for AES is that nobody has been able to show that
its encryption functions are any closer to linear maps than arbitrary random
functions.
4/IX/2018 Preprint 2010 CGC latex
2 A possible intrinsic weakness of AES and other cryptosystems
However, it might be possible to extend AES to act on bigger spaces, in
such a way that the non-random behavior of AES becomes easier to spot.
For example, it was hoped that embedding AES into BES would allow eas-
ier 1 polynomial systems to break the ciphers (see [MR02], [TZ05]). Generally
speaking, the worst scenario consists of a space large enough to make AES
linear but small enough to allow practical computations. This is probably not
possible. Our goal is to find a space small enough to allow practical computa-
tions but large enough to identify a specific behavior of AES, showing that it
is closer to linear maps than expected.
In Section 1, after some basic algebraic background, we explain our point of
view on block ciphers. In particular, we introduce the class of translation based
cryptosystems, which are ciphers enjoying some interesting algebraic proper-
ties. We also briefly describe the three main translation-based cryptosystems:
AES, SERPENT and PRESENT.
For completeness, in Section 2 we list the best-known attacks on round-
reduced versions of AES.
In Section 3 we provide formal techniques to construct a larger space on
which the block cipher can act. We call these techniques space embeddings.
In the case of translation-based ciphers, these embeddings are designed to
lower the non-linearity of the encryption functions. We present one specific
embedding and we obtain several results on the rank distributions for matrices
in the larger space, which are useful to mount attacks.
In Section 4 we present a larger embedding, that apparently works well
with AES and other translation-based systems. The effectiveness of this em-
bedding depends heavily on properties of the mixing-layer.
In Section 5 we outline our approach to attack translation-based ciphers
(including AES) with our embeddings. Although we have not been able to find
an attack giving satisfactory statistical evidence, we have some partial data
suggesting that our methods may work, as reported in [RSB10]
In Section 6 we discuss further on our non-linearity notion:
• first, we report results from [Mai09],[MRS10] on embeddings where the
decrease in non-linearity can be formally proved;
• then, we propose alternative embeddings highlighting their flaws;
• finally, with group theory proofs we also show that it is very unlikely that
a representation/embedding can completely linearize any version of AES.
1 easier than systems coming from random maps.
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1 Preliminaries
In this section we recall well-known results in group theory and finite field
theory [LN97] in order to fix the notation we will use in the sequel. We also
outline some basic ideas about block ciphers and we recall the structure of
three well-known cryptosystems: AES, SERPENT and PRESENT.
1.1 Group representations
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Let V = (F2)n be the vector space over the
finite field F2 of dimension n. We denote by Sym(V ) and Alt(V ), respectively,
the symmetric and alternating group on V . For any N , we denote by SymN
and AltN , respectively, the symmetric and alternating group on {1, . . . , N}.
Clearly Sym(V ) is isomorphic to Sym2n (the same for the alternating group).
We denote by GL(V ) the group of all linear permutations of V . We recall the
well-known formulas:
|Sym(V )| = 2n!, |Alt(V )| = 2
n!
2
|GL(V )| =
n−1∏
h=0
(2n − 2h) < 2n2 .
Given a finite group G, we say that G can be linearized if there is an injective
morphism ρ : G → GL(V ) (this is called a “faithful representation” in repre-
sentation theory). If G can be linearized, then, for any element g ∈ G, we can
compute a matrix Mg corresponding to the action of g over V (via ρ). The
matrix computation is easy, since it is enough to evaluate g on a basis of V .
If ρ : G → GL(V ) is a representation of G on V , then we often write vg
instead of vρ(g), if no confusion arises. Also, G is said to act linearly on V ,
and V is called a G-module. The degree of the representation is by definition
the dimension of V . If we consider SymN , we can always linearize SymN over
V via the so-called regular representation as follows.
Let V be a vector space with basis {e1, . . . , eN}. The regular representation
ρ : SymN → GL(V ) is defined by (ei)ρ(g) = eig. In other words, any permuta-
tion in SymN is associated to a permutation (N ×N) matrix (and viceversa).
Since any finite group G can be embedded in SymN for a smallest N , we can
always linearize G using the regular representation. But of course this is huge
and usually impractical.
1.2 Finite Fields
For any prime p and any positive m ∈ N, Fpm is the field with pm elements
(unique up to field isomorphism). It contains an isomorphic copy of Fp and can
thus be thought as an extension of Fp. On the other hand, we can construct
any Fqs from Fq with q = p
m elements, as follows.
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Let f ∈ Fq[x] be an irreducible polynomial of degree m. We can consider
the quotient R = Fq[x]/(f), where (f) is the ideal generated by f in Fq[x]. By
considering the natural projection π : Fq[x]→ R, we call α = π(x) and clearly
any element of R can be uniquely expressed as a polynomial in α of degree
less than m:
R =
{
m−1∑
i=0
aiα
i | ai ∈ Fq
}
with the condition f(α) = 0.
Theorem 1.1. R = Fq[x]/(f) is a field and R ∼= Fqm.
We denote by F∗q the multiplicative group of non-zero elements of Fq.
Theorem 1.2. For any finite field Fq, the multiplicative group F
∗
q is cyclic.
A generator of the cyclic group F∗q is called a primitive element of Fq.
Definition 1.3. An irreducible polynomial f ∈ Fq[x] is primitive if its roots
are primitive elements.
Note that for any q and m there are indeed irreducible polynomials of
degree m over Fq and some of them are primitive.
1.3 Permutation polynomials
Definition 1.4. A polynomial f ∈ Fq[x] is a permutation polynomial of Fq if
the associated polynomial function f : c 7→ f(c) from Fq into Fq is a permu-
tation of Fq. If f is an affine map f : x 7→ ax+ b (a 6= 0), we say that f is a
linear polynomial.
We note the following easy results:
(1) Every linear polynomial over Fq is a permutation polynomial of Fq.
(2) The monomial xn is a permutation polynomial of Fq if and only if
gcd(n, q − 1) = 1.
Permutation polynomials of Fq of degree less then q can be combined by the
operation of composition and subsequent reduction modulo xq −x. The set of
permutation polynomials of Fq of degree less then q forms a group, which is
isomorphic to Sym(Fq). Then, the symmetric group Sym(Fq) and its subgroups
can be represented as groups of permutation polynomials.
Theorem 1.5. For q > 2, the symmetric group Sym(Fq) is generated by x
q−2
and all linear polynomials over Fq.
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1.4 Block ciphers
Block ciphers form an important class of cryptosystems in symmetric key
cryptography. These are algorithms that encrypt and decrypt blocks of data
(with fixed length 2 ) according to a shared secret key. We can formally describe
such a cryptosystem using the following definition:
Definition 1.6. A cryptosystem is a pair (M,K), where:
• M is a finite set of possible messages (plaintexts, ciphertexts);
• K, the key-space, is a finite set of possible keys;
• we have encryption and decryption functions for any key k ∈ K:
φk :M→M, ψk :M→M, φk, ψk ∈ Sym(M)
such that
ψk = (φk)
−1.
Following the most used structure in modern ciphers, in the previous def-
inition we set that the plaintext space coincides with the ciphertext space.
W.l.o.g, we can consider M = (Fq)r and K = (Fq)ℓ, with r and ℓ positive
integers, and we change slightly our previous definition.
Definition 1.7. Let r and ℓ be natural numbers. Let φ be any function
φ : (Fq)
r × (Fq)ℓ → (Fq)r.
For any k ∈ (Fq)ℓ, we denote by φk the function
φk : (Fq)
r → (Fq)r, φk(x) = φ(x, k).
We say that φ is a algebraic block cipher if φk is a permutation of (Fq)
r for
any key k ∈ (Fq)ℓ.
Under this conditions, we can also consider a block cipher as an indexed set
of permutations (Fq)
ℓ → Sym((Fq)r). Any key k ∈ K induces a permutation
φk on M. Since M is usually V = (F2)r for some r ∈ N, we can consider
φk ∈ Sym(V ).
To achieve the desired security, most modern block ciphers are iterated
ciphers that typically incorporate sequences of permutation and substitution
operations. In fact, according to the ideas that Shannon proposed in his sem-
inal paper [Sha49], the encryption process takes as input a plaintext and a
2 Actually, there is a recent approach that allows a slight change of the block length
[CYK09]
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random key and so proceeds through N similar rounds. In each round (except
possibly for a couple, which may be slightly different) the iterated ciphers
perform a non-linear substitution operation (or S-box) on disjoint parts of
the input that provides “confusion”, followed by a permutation (usually a
linear/affine transformation) on the whole data that provides “diffusion”. A
cryptosystem reaches “confusion” if the relationship between plaintext, cipher-
text and key is very complicated. The “diffusion” idea consists of spreading
the influence of all parts of the input (plaintext and key) to all parts of the
ciphertext. The operations performed in a round form the round function. The
round function at the ρ-th round (1 ≤ ρ ≤ N) takes as inputs both the output
of the (ρ− 1)-th round and the subkey k(ρ) (also called round-key). Any round
key k(ρ) is constructed starting from a master key 3 k of some specified length,
e.g. k ∈ K = (F2)ℓ (nowadays we have 264 ≤ |K| ≤ 2256). The key schedule is
a public algorithm (strictly dependent on the cipher) which constructs N + 1
subkeys (k(0), . . . , k(N)).
Several independent formal definitions have been proposed for iterated
block ciphers (or subclasses of them). Stinson in [Sti95] gives the following
definition of substitution permutation network (SPN for short). In [DR02] we
can find another class of iterated block cipher, called the key-alternating block
ciphers.
Now, we consider a more recent definition [CDS09] that defines a class (see
Definition 1.9), large enough to include some common ciphers, yet restricted
enough to have simple criteria guaranteeing an interesting property of the
cipher (for details see Subsection 6.3).
Let V = (F2)
r with r = mb, b ≥ 2. The vector space V is a direct sum
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vb,
where each Vi has the same dimension m (over F2). For any v ∈ V , we will
write v = v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vb, where vi ∈ Vi. Also, we consider the projections
πi : V → Vi mapping v 7→ vi.
Any γ ∈ Sym(V ) that acts as vγ = v1γ1⊕· · ·⊕vbγb, for some γi ∈ Sym(Vi),
is a bricklayer transformation (a “parallel map”) and any γi is a brick. The maps
γi’s are traditionally called S-boxes and map γ is called a “parallel S-box”.
A linear (or affine) map λ : V → V is traditionally called a “Mixing Layer”
when used in composition with parallel maps. We denote by σv a translation
over V .
Definition 1.8. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) is a proper mixing layer if no sum
of some of the Vi (except {0} and V ) is invariant under λ.
We can characterize the “translation based” class by the following
3 also called session key.
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Definition 1.9. We say that C is translation based (tb) if:
• it is the composition of a finite number of rounds, such that any round τk
can be written 4 as γλσk¯, where
· γ is a round-dependent bricklayer transformation (but it does not
depend on k),
· λ is a round-dependent linear map (but it does not depend on k),
· k¯ is in V and depends on both k and the round (k¯ is called a “round
key”);
• for at least one round we have (at the same time) that λ is proper and
that the map K → V , k 7→ k¯, is surjective (a “proper” round).
In [CDS09] the authors gave several non-trivial remarks that can be useful.
Let us recall the principal ones.
Remark 1.10. A generalization is obtained by allowing a key-independent per-
mutation at the beginning and/or another at the end. This is the case for ex-
ample for the SERPENT cipher. Since these permutations have no influence
on the cryptanalysis of a cipher, they can be ignored.
Remark 1.11. A round consisting of only a translation is still acceptable, by
assuming γ = λ = 1V (the identity map on V ), although obviously it is
not proper. Indeed, we can always assume that the first round is of this kind,
otherwise we can remove its γ and λ (Remark 1.10). Then, we can also assume
that 0γ = 0, since we can add 0γ to the round key of the previous round.
If the previous round is proper, it remains proper since σ0γ is a permutation
over V .
Remark 1.12. To allow affine mixing layers, rather than linear mixing layers,
seems a generalization. However, this case is indeed already present in Defini-
tion 1.9, since it is enough to change σv to incorporate the “translation part”
of the mixing layer.
Remark 1.13. A generalization can be obtained by only requiring at least
one of the rounds to be of the prescribed form (with a proper mixing layer).
Although the authors’ results still hold in this more general case, we do not
know any interesting cipher of this kind.
Note that some famous ciphers, such as the DES, KASUMI and IDEA
ciphers, cannot be seen easily as tb ciphers. Some of them (e.g. DES and
KASUMI) are of Feistel type. They modify only one half of the cipher state in
each round. It has been suggested that the Feistel ciphers suffer from a slow
speed of diffusion compared to SPN (or key-iterated) ciphers.
In the Subsections 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 we are going to describe respectively AES,
SERPENT and PRESENT as translation based cryptosystems 5 .
4 we drop round indexes.
5 The reader can find a full description of these cryptosystems respectively in
[DR02], [ABK98] and [AKL+07]
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1.5 The AES-128 cryptosystem
Let M = K = V = (F2)r with r = 128 and let x ∈ M be our plaintext,
k ∈ K our random key and y = φk(x) the corresponding ciphertext. Before
describing the individual components γ, λ and σk of the round function, we
recall (see Section 1.2) that it is possible to identify (F2)
8 with the field F28 ,
via the quotient map F28 ↔ F2[x]/〈m〉, where m ∈ F2[x] is an irreducible
polynomial such that deg(m) = 8. The irreducible (but not primitive) AES
polynomial is m = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1.
Internally, the AES algorithm’s operations are performed on a two-dimen-
sional array of bytes, called the State. It consists of 4 rows and 4 columns and
each element of this matrix is one byte (i.e. an element of F28 = F256). At the
start of the encryption process, the input x (the plaintext) is a vector in V
and it is first changed into a 16-byte vector:
ν : (F2)
128 → (F256)16, x 7→ y.
Each round performs its operations on the State and after the last round the
State is “unwrapped” and “fills up” the output vector.
A preliminary translation σk(0) , where k
(0) ∈ (F2)r is the first round key,
is applied to the plaintext to form the input to the (Round 1). It means that
we can consider a preliminary round (Round 0) such that γ = 1V and λ = 1V
(see Remark 1.11).
In order to obtain the ciphertext, other N = 10 rounds follow.
Let 1 ≤ ρ ≤ N − 1. A typical round (Round ρ) can be written as the compo-
sition 6 γλσk(ρ), where
• the parallel map γ is called SubBytes and it works in parallel to each of
the 16 bytes of the data;
• the affine map λ is the composition of two operations known as ShiftRows
and MixColumns;
• σk(ρ) is the translation with the session key k(ρ) (this operation is called
AddRoundKey).
The last round (Round N) is atypical and is characterized by γλ¯σk(N)
where the affine map λ¯ is only made by the ShiftRows operation. So we obtain
our ciphertext y = φk(x).
In the following, we analyze the structure of each component of the round
function.
6 Note that the order of the operation is exactly: γ, λ, and then σk.
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1.5.1 SubBytes
The vector space V is the direct sum V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ V16 where each
Vi = (F2)
8 (1 ≤ i ≤ 16). Any parallel map γ ∈ Sym(V ) acts on an element
v ∈ V as vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ v16γ16, where vi ∈ Vi and γi ∈ Sym(Vi). The
SubBytes operation γ is composed by two transformations: the inversion in
F28 and an affine transformation.
The inversion operation is the patched inversion 7 in F28 (i.e. ϕ(x) = x
254).
The affine transformation over F2 consists of an affine mapping ξ : (F2)
8 →
(F2)
8, specified by an 8 × 8 circulant matrix over F2 and a translation. The
result of inversion is regarded as a vector in (F2)
8 and the output is given by
y = ξ(x), where


y7
y6
y5
y4
y3
y2
y1
y0


=


1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1




x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
x0


+


0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1


1.5.2 Mixing Layer
The map λ : V → V is a composition of two linear operations: ShiftRows
and MixColumns. The ShiftRows operation is performed as follows. Any byte
(an element of F28) in row i of the State, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, is cyclically shifted
(towards left) by i positions, as follows:
s0 s4 s8 s12
s1 s5 s9 s13
s2 s6 s10 s14
s3 s7 s11 s15
→ ShiftRows →
s0 s4 s8 s12
s5 s9 s13 s1
s10 s14 s2 s6
s15 s3 s7 s11
7 Since the AES consists of 10 rounds and each round requires 16 S-box com-
putations, the probability of there being no 0-inversions during an encryption is
(255/256)160 ≈ 0.53.
10 A possible intrinsic weakness of AES and other cryptosystems
In other words, we can describe the ShiftRows operation by the map
sh : (F28)
16 → (F28)16
(s0, s1, · · · , s15) 7→ (s0, s5, s10, s15, s4, s9, s14, s3, s8, s13, s2, s7, s12, s1, s6, s11).
We can also represent the ShiftRows operation with the following 16× 16
block diagonal matrix
S =


I 0 0 0
0 R 0 0
0 0 R2 0
0 0 0 R3

 R =


0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0


where the matrix R is a permutation matrix over F28 that represents the shift
of one row by one position.
In order to describe the MixColumns operation, each column of the State
can be treated as a four-term polynomial in F256[z]. Let c(z) be one such
polynomial. Then each column is replaced by the result of the multiplication
in F256[z]/(z
4 + 1) by a(z), c 7→ c · a mod (z4 + 1),
(c1, c2, c3, c4) −→ (c1 · a, c2 · a, c3 · a, c3 · a) .
Note that a(z) is invertible in F256[z]/(z
4 +1). On the other hand, we can see
the MixColumns operation as a 4-block diagonal matrix, each block the same
MDS matrix (i.e. all minors are non-zero):


z z + 1 1 1
1 z z + 1 1
1 1 z z + 1
z + 1 1 1 z


Remark 1.14. This MDS property is used to ensure that the number of active
S-boxes involved in a differential or linear attack increases rapidly, and the
security of the AES against these particular attacks can be established.
Obviously, we can also see the whole Mixing Layer (λ linear operation)
as a matrix M. We observe that the order of this matrix is quite small, i.e.
M8 = 1. (Also, both the order of ShiftRows and MixColumns are equal to 4.)
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1.6 The SERPENT cryptosystem
Let M = V = (F2)r, with r = 128. We consider K = (F2)ℓ, with the fixed
length ℓ = 128, although the key is designed with variable length.
The encryption φ proceeds by N = 32 similar rounds and it works as follows:
• a preliminary permutation is applied π : V → V (this is not used for
security, rather to ease the implementation);
• there is a preliminary translation with the first round key;
• N − 1 rounds with the same structure are applied, but using a different
permutation, each composed of a key translation σk, a parallel S-box γ
and a linear mixing-layer λ (we denote the round ρ by Round ρ, with
ρ = 1, ..., 31);
• the last round (Round 32) follows and it consists of the composition γλσk
where λ = 1V ;
• a final permutation π−1 : V → V is performed.
The decryption process is easily obtained by inverting every step of the
encryption, using the inverse of the S-boxes, the inverse of the mixing-layer
and the reverse order of the round keys.
Let ρ be a natural number such that 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 31. In order to describe a
typical round (Round ρ) we have to specify how the components γ, λ and σk
are applied. We note that, after the permutation π : V → V , we perform a
preliminary translation σk(0), where k
(0) ∈ (F2)r is the first round key.
Let V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ V32, where , for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 32, each Vj = (F2)4. Any
γ ∈ Sym(V ) acts as vγ = v1γ1⊕ . . .⊕v32γ32, where vj ∈ Vj and γj ∈ Sym(Vj).
We have to characterize each γj (i.e. we have to construct each S-box).
The eight S-boxes S1, . . . , S8 of SERPENT were built “ad hoc” starting from
the 8 fixed S-boxes of DES (see [ABK98]). To each vj we apply the same S-
box Si mod 8, so that Si mod 8(vj) lies in (F2)
4. That is, γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γ32 =
Si mod 8.
Then the linear transformation λ (described in [ABK98]) and a final trans-
lation σk(ρ) are applied. The last round (Round 32) is only slightly different.
The only difference with a typical round is the replacing of the linear trans-
formation λ by 1V .
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1.7 PRESENT: an ultra-lightweight block cipher
PRESENT is an iterated block cipher that consists of N = 31 rounds.
Let M = V = (F2)r with r = 64. Let K = (F2)ℓ, where ℓ may be equal to 80
or 128. We consider only the PRESENT’s version such that K = (F2)80, since
its authors recommend it in order to have a good performance.
We are going to describe how the round function γλσk(ρ) (in the ρ-th typical
round) is performed.
As in the AES and SERPENT cryptosystems, the encryption process starts
with a preliminary round (Round 0) that consists of a parallel map γ = 1V , a
linear transformation λ = 1V and the translation σk(0) , where k
(0) ∈ (F2)r is
the first round key. A typical round consists of the non-linear operation, called
sBoxLayer, the linear transformation, known as pLayer and the sum with the
round key.
The parallel map γ ∈ Sym(V ) used in PRESENT acts as
vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ . . .⊕ v16γ16,
where each vi ∈ (F2)4 and γi ∈ Sym((F2)4) (1 ≤ i ≤ 16). The action of any
brick γi : (F2)
4 → (F2)4 is given by the following table, using an hexadecimal
notation:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
γ[x] C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
The affine map λ : V → V is a bit permutation as given by the following
table, where the bit i of the intermediate state is moved to the bit position
P (i).
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P (i) 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P (i) 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P (i) 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P (i) 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63
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2 Known attacks
AES’s structure has been used to carry out some innovative analysis. Such
attacks tend to have a similar form:
• they identify a property holding for a few rounds with a good probability;
• they use special techniques to extend the attack to more rounds.
The following table summarizes the more successful attacks on round-
reduced versions of the AES cryptosystem:
Key Rounds Texts Time Type Reference
128 5 211 240 Square attack [DR98]
128 5 229.5 231 Impossible diff. [BK00]
128 5 239 239 Boomerang attack [Bir04]
128 6 232 272 Square attack [DR98]
128 6 234.6 244 Partial Sum [FKL+00]
128 6 291.5 2122 Impossible diff. [CKK+01]
128 6 271 271 Boomerang attack [Bir04]
128 7 2128 − 2119 2120 Partial Sum [FKL+00]
128 7 232 2128 Collision [GM00]
192 7 291.2 2139.2 Impossible diff. [?]
192 8 2127 2188 Partial Sum [FKL+00]
192 10 2124 2183 (Related-key) Rectangle [BDK05]
192 12 2123 2176 (Related-key) Ampl. Boomerang [BK09]
256 8 232 2194 Partial Sum [FKL+00]
256 9 285 2126 Partial Sum [FKL+00]
256 10 2114 2173 (Related-key) Rectangle [BDK05]
256 14 2119 2119 (Related-key) Boomerang [BK09]
Other researchers attack small scale variants of the AES, where also the mes-
sage space and the key space are reduced (see e.g.[CW09]). A recent prac-
tical attack (due to A.Biryukov, O.Dunkelman, N.Keller, D.Khovratovich,
A.Shamir) on a (10-round version) of AES-256 has been presented ([BDK+10]).
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3 First results
In the literature there are some ways of representing the same cipher (e.g.
AES), like BES [MR02] or Dual Ciphers [BB02], that could be useful for the
cryptanalysis. Other ways of representing AES that exploit its structure can
be found, for example, in [CMR07].
In this section we represent “AES-like” ciphers by embedding them into larger
ciphers. In Subsection 3.1 we begin with We want to enlarge Ω to a set W
such that:
(1) W is endowed with a vector space structure;
(2) the permutations can be extended to act linearly on the whole W .
In Subsection 3.2 we provide one specific embedding of AES-like ciphers that
linearizes the non-linear part of these ciphers, but it fails to linearize the whole
cipher. In particular our embedding can be applied to AES, PRESENT and
SERPENT.
3.1 Some preliminary results
Let Ω be a set such that |Ω| = n, let Sym(Ω) be the symmetric group on
Ω and let W be a vector space over a field F (not necessarily a finite field).
Definition 3.1. Let G ≤ Sym(Ω). An injective map φ : Ω → W is a space
embedding with respect to the group G if, ∀σ ∈ G, ∃Aσ ∈ GL(W ) such that
φ ◦ σ = Aσ ◦ φ.
Moreover, φ(Ω) is the set of all admissible vectors (w.r.t. φ), the subspace
〈φ(Ω)〉 is the admissible space. Note that since φ(Ω) ⊂ 〈φ(Ω)〉 then 〈φ(Ω)〉 is
the smallest subspace containing all admissible vectors. Generally speaking,
|〈φ(Ω)〉| >> |φ(Ω)|.
Note that the regular representation (see Subsection 1.1) can be considered
as a space embedding φ : Ω → W with respect to the group G = Sym(Ω),
where dim(W ) = |Ω| = n and φ : ω 7→ bω with {bω}ω∈Ω a basis of W . Also,
W = 〈φ(Ω)〉.
A space embedding permits to construct a faithful representation of G, as
explained in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let α : Ω → W be a space embedding with respect to G.
Suppose that ∀σ ∈ G ∃!Aσ ∈ GL(W ) s.t. φ ◦ σ = Aσ ◦ φ. Then
(1) we can define a map φ˜ : G→ GL(W ), where φ˜(σ) = Aσ, for any σ ∈ G;
(2) φ˜ is a group homomorphism.
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Proof. 1. Obvious.
2. We have to prove that φ˜(σσ′) = φ˜(σ)φ˜(σ′) for all σ, σ′ ∈ G, i.e. Aσσ′ =
AσAσ′ . Using Definition 3.1, the following equality holds
Aσσ′(φ(ω)) = φ((σσ
′)(ω)) = φ(σ(σ′(ω))).
Since
AσAσ′(φ(ω)) = Aσ(φ(σ
′(ω))) = φ(σ(σ′(ω))),
we conclude that Aσσ′ = AσAσ′ , for all ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 3.3. In Definition 3.1 we require only that Aσ exists, however in
Theorem 3.2 we see that it is also unique.
For example, for the regular representation any permutation σ ∈ Sym(Ω)
defines a permutation σ ∈ Sym({bω}ω∈Ω) and so it defines a unique Aσ ∈
GL(W ), which can be represented as a permutation matrix.
Now, we are interested in a special case of space embedding where the set
Ω is a vector space V = (F2)
r and W is the vector space (F2)
s, with s > r.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ s, let ei ∈ W :
ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1↑
i
, 0, . . . , 0) .
Let σ ∈ Sym(V ) be any permutation over (F2)r. We want to embed V into
W by an injective map α and to extend σ to a permutation σ′ ∈ Sym(W ) as
shown in the following commutative diagram:
V
σ

α //W
σ′

V
α //W
In order to do this, we have to define the permutation σ′ ∈ Sym(W ). We say
that σ′ is an extension of σ. We seek a σ′ that is linear on W . The following
definition will be useful:
Definition 3.4. Let σ ∈ Sym(V ) and α be an injective map α : V →W . We
say that σ is linearly extendible (via α) if ∀{vi}i∈I ⊂ V we have∑
i∈I
α(vi) = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
i∈I
α(σ(vi)) = 0.
Remark 3.5. Since we are considering the finite field F2, we note that σ is
linearly extendible (via α) if ∀{vi}i∈I ⊂ V such that
∑
i∈I α(v
i) = 0 we have∑
i∈I α(σ(v
i)) = 0. In fact, an injective map defined on the set
{{vi}I ⊂ V |
∑
i∈I
α(vi) = 0}}
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into the set
{{σ(vi)}I ⊂ V |
∑
i∈I
α(σ(vi)) = 0}}
is a bijective map, since the cardinality of the two finite sets is the same.
Let α : V → W be a space embedding. Let A = Im(α) = α(V ) and let
T = 〈A〉 be the subspace (the admissible space) of W linearly generated by
A. Since σ′(α(v)) = α(σ(v)), ∀v ∈ V , we require that σ′(A) = A.
A A
T T
W \ T W \ T
W W
V
α
σ′
In order to specify the behavior of σ′ on (T \A), which is the space of non-
admissible vectors in the admissible space, we have to consider two different
cases:
(a) suppose that σ is linearly extendible. Let t ∈ T , we must have t =∑
1≤j≤ι a
j , with ι ≥ 1, with {aj}1≤j≤i ⊂ A, aj = α(vj) (with 1 ≤ j ≤ ι
and vj ∈ V ). Then we define
σ′(t) =
∑
1≤j≤ι
σ′(aj) =
∑
1≤j≤ι
α(σ(vj));
(b) in case σ is not linearly extendible, we define σ′|T\A = idT\A.
We now define σ′ onW \T according to the two previous cases (i.e. depending
on the behavior of σ on A).
In case (a), let τ be the dimension of the subspace T . We consider any subset
B of {e1, . . . , es} such that |B| = s−τ and W is the direct sum W = T ⊕〈B〉.
It is obvious that B exists. Let w ∈ W , then w = wT + wB with wT ∈ T and
wB ∈ 〈B〉. Finally, we define
σ′(w) = σ′(wT ) + wB.
In case (b) we define σ′|W\T = idW\T .
Lemma 3.6. If σ is linearly extendible, then σ′ ∈ GL(W ).
Proof. We first show that σ′ is well-defined on T . Let t =
∑
I a
i and t′ =∑
J a
j and suppose that t = t′. Since σ is linearly extendible, we have
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0 = t+ t′=
∑
I
ai +
∑
J
aj =
∑
I
α(vi) +
∑
J
α(vj) =
∑
I∪J
α(vi)
σ′(t) + σ′(t′) =
∑
I
σ′(ai) +
∑
J
σ′(aj) =
∑
I
α(σ(vi)) +
∑
J
α(σ(vj))
=
∑
I∪J
α(σ(vi)) = 0.
We now show that σ′ is linear on T . Let ti =
∑
h a
(i)
h . We have to show that
σ′(
∑
i ti) =
∑
i σ
′(ti). Clearly,
σ′
(∑
i
∑
h
a
(i)
h
)
= σ′
(∑
i,h
a
(i)
h
)
=
∑
i
∑
h
σ′(a(i)h ) =
∑
i
(∑
h
σ′(a(i)h )
)
=
∑
i
σ′(ti)
and we have our thesis.
Since σ′ is linear on T and T is a finite set, in order to prove that σ′ is
bijective on T it suffices to show that ker σ′ = 0. We have (by definition of
linearly extendible)
0 = σ′(t) =
∑
α(σ(vj)) ⇐⇒ 0 =
∑
α(vj) = t
Finally, we show the linearity on W . Let {wi}i∈I ⊂ W , we have to show
the following equality
σ′
(∑
i∈I
wi
)
=
∑
i∈I
σ′(wi). (1)
Since W is direct sum of T and 〈B〉, each element wi in W can be considered
as wiT + w
i
B and so we can write the following
σ′
(∑
i∈I
wi
)
=σ′
(∑
i∈I
(wiT + w
i
B)
)
= σ′
(∑
i∈I
wiT
)
+
∑
i∈I
wiB∑
i∈I
σ′(wi) =
∑
i∈I
σ′(wiT + w
i
B) =
∑
i∈I
σ′(wiT ) +
∑
i∈I
wiB.
It easily follows that (1) holds if and only if
σ′
(∑
i∈I
wiT
)
=
∑
i∈I
σ′(wiT ).
Remark 3.7. The construction of σ′ ∈ GL(W ) from σ linearly extendible (Def-
inition 3.4) can be done similarly over any field.
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We are now able to prove the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 3.8. Let W = (F2)
r and G ≤ Sym(V ). An injective map α : V →
W is a space embedding with respect to G if and only if, ∀σ ∈ G, σ is linearly
extendible.
Proof. Let α be a space embedding with respect to G. For any fixed σ ∈ G,
there exists a map Aσ ∈ GL(W ) such that α ◦σ = Aσ ◦α. Now, let {wi}i∈I be
a finite set such that wi = α(vi) (for any i ∈ I) and ∑i∈I wi = 0. Obviously
we have∑
i∈I
α(σ(vi)) =
∑
i∈I
Aσ(α(v
i)) =
∑
i∈I
Aσ(w
i) = Aσ
(∑
i∈I
wi
)
= 0.
The converse immediately follows thanks to the previous lemma.
Remark 3.9. For a fixed α and σ, the map σ′ is unique and α˜ : G→ GL(W )
is a representation of G, by Proposition 3.2.
Remark 3.10. In the following we use Aσ and σ
′ interchangeably.
3.2 A first embedding
We now apply the theory developed in the previous section to a specific
space embedding 8 ε : V →W .
Let us identify (F2)
m with the field F2m , via the quotient map F2m ↔
F2[x]/〈p〉, where p ∈ F2[x] is any primitive polynomial such that deg(p) = m.
We define a map ε′ : F2m → (F2)2m by means of a primitive element γ of F2m
(which is a root of p). The map ε′ is defined as
ε′(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2m−1
) ε′(γi) = (0, . . . , 0, 1
↑
i+1
, 0, . . . , 0) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1 .
Note that ε′(1) = ε′(γ2
m−1) = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2m−1
, 1).
Let b be a positive integer, let r = mb and s = 2mb. Let V = (F2)
r and
W = (F2)
s. We construct our injective map ε : V → W in the following way:
ε(v1, . . . , vb) = (ε
′(v1), . . . , ε′(vb)) (2)
for any vj ∈ (F2)m ( 1 ≤ j ≤ b). Note that ε is a parallel 9 map.
For simplicity of notation, we set e1 = ε
′(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2m−1
) and ei+1 = ε
′(γi),
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1.
8 which is called “α” in Subsection 3.1.
9 see Subsection 1.4.
A. Rimoldi, M. Sala, I. Toli 19
We note that
Lemma 3.11. Suppose that
∑
i∈I ei = eh. Then h ∈ I.
Proof. It follows from w(ei) = 1, for all i ∈ I.
The following lemma is easily proved:
Lemma 3.12. Let I be a finite index multiset such that {vi}I ⊂ V . For any
1 ≤ h ≤ b we have ∑i∈I ε′(vih) = 0 if and only if, ∀i ∈ I, |{j ∈ I | vjh = vih}|
is even.
Proof. Since ε′ maps each element of (F2)m into the canonical basis of (F2)2
m
,
each ε′(vih) is a vector such that w(ε
′(vih)) = 1. Considering the following sum
in F2, we have that
∑
I ε
′(vih) = 0 if and only if each component is made by
an even number of 1, i.e. if and only if each element of the canonic basis that
appears in our sum has an even weight. Since ε′ is bijective, we have that
|{j ∈ I | vjh = vih}| is even, ∀i ∈ I.
Proposition 3.13. Let ε as in (2). Then dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉) = 2mb− (b− 1).
Proof. We define the elements
zi,j = (e1, . . . , e1, ej
↑
i
, e1, . . . , e1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ b and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m. Note that zi,j 6= zh,ℓ for (i, j) 6= (h, ℓ), except
for z11 = z21 = . . . = zb1. We consider the set B = {z1,1} ∪ {zi,j}j≥2, 1≤i≤b. For
instance, when m = 2 and b = 2, we have
B = {(e1, e1), (e1, e2), (e1, e3), (e1, e4), (e2, e1), (e3, e1), (e4, e1)}.
Clearly, the cardinality of the set B is given by
|{zi,j}1≤b, 1≤j≤2m | − |{zi,1}i≥2| = 2mb− (b− 1).
We claim that the set B is a basis for the subspace 〈Im(ε)〉.
First, we prove that B is a linearly independent set. Suppose zi,j ∈ B such
that (i, j) 6= (1, 1). By definition of B, the element zi,j is the unique element of
B having a vector ej in position i. Thus, zi,j cannot be the linear combination
(i.e. a sum) of any other vectors of B (see Lemma 3.11). Now, we have to
consider the element z1,1. Let z1,1 =
∑
(i,j)∈J zi,j . W.l.o.g., we can assume by
Lemma 3.11 that there is (¯i, j¯) ∈ J such that zi¯,j¯ = (e1, . . .). Since zi¯,j¯ 6= z1,1
we can assume w.l.o.g. zi¯,j¯ = (e1, ej¯, e1, . . . , e1), i.e. i¯ = 2. There is no other
zi,j having ej¯ in the second position. Therefore, the sum z1,1 should contain a
1 in component m+ j¯, which is impossible.
Next, we prove that B generates 〈Im(ε)〉. To do that, it suffices to prove
that every element of Im(ε) belongs to the subspace generated by B. If we
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consider an element w = (ej1 , . . . , ejb) ∈ Im(ε), we have
w =

 z1,j1 + · · ·+ zb,jb if b is odd,z1,j1 + · · ·+ zb,jb + z1,1 if b is even,
since
(ej1, e1, . . . , e1)+
b− 1


( e1, ej2 , . . . , e1)+
...
( e1, . . . , e1 , ejb) =
(ej1 , ej2, . . . , ejb)
b odd
( e1, e1, . . . , e1)+
(ej1, e1, . . . , e1)+
b− 1


( e1, ej2, . . . , e1)+
...
( e1, . . . , e1 , ejb) =
(ej1 , ej2, . . . , ejb)
b even
LetA be a subset of the plaintext setM such that |A| = dimF2 (〈Im(ε)〉) =
2mb − (b− 1). Let ai ∈ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|. We construct the (|A| × 2mb)-matrix
H such that the i-th row is the image of the parallel map ε applied to the
plaintext ai ∈ A, for i ∈ {1, · · · , |A|}:
H =


ε(a1)
ε(a2)
...
ε(a|A|)

 =


ε′(a11) ε
′(a12) · · · ε′(a1b)
ε′(a21) ε
′(a22) · · · ε′(a2b)
...
...
...
...
ε′(a|A|1 ) ε
′(a|A|2 ) · · · ε′(a|A|b )

 . (3)
We would like to determine the expected rank for such a matrix. Generally
speaking, for a random (t × n)-matrix with entries in the finite field Fq, we
can use the following well known results:
Theorem 3.14 ([MMM04]). Let t, k, n ∈ N \ {0}, where k ≤ n and k ≤ t.
(1) The number of ordered k-tuples of linearly independent vectors in (Fq)
n
is
(qn − 1)(qn − q)(qn − q2) · · · (qn − qk−1).
(2) The number of k-dimensional subspaces of (Fq)
n is given by the q-binomial
coefficient (
n
k
)
q
=
∏
0≤i≤k−1(q
n − qi)∏
0≤i≤k−1(q
k − qi) .
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(3) The number of (t × n)-matrices of rank k with entries in Fq is given by
the following formula
dk,t =
(
n
k
)
q
∏
0≤i≤k−1
(qt − qi).
We note that(
n
k−1
)
q(
n
k
)
q
=
qk − 1
qn−k+1 − 1 . (4)
By using the previous theorem, the relation in (4) and observing that
dt−2,t
dt,t
=
dt−2,t
dt−1,t
dt−1,t
dt,t
we immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary 3.15. Let q = 2 and suppose t < n. We have the following rela-
tions:
dt,t= (2
n − 1)(2n − 2) · · · (2n − 2t−1);
dt−1,t
dt,t
=
(2t − 1)
(2n − 2t−1) <
1
2n−t−1
≤ 1;
dt−2,t
dt,t
=
(2t − 1)(2t−1 − 1)
3(2n − 2t−2)(2n − 2t−1) .
Corollary 3.16. Let q = 2 and suppose t = n. We have the following rela-
tions:
dn,n=(2
n − 1)(2n − 2) · · · (2n − 2n−1);
dn−1,n
dn,n
=
2n − 1
2n−1
≈ 2 > 1;
dn−2,n
dn,n
=
(2n − 1)(2n−1 − 1)
9 · 22n−3 .
In other words, the probability that a (t×n) random matrix (t < n) with
entries in F2 has rank exactly t is significantly greater than the probability
of having rank equal to t − 1 or t − 2 or less. Instead, the probability that a
square (n× n) random matrix has rank n− 1 is the greatest.
Remark 3.17. In theory, the previous theorem cannot be applied to our case
because our construction imposes specific constraints, for example on the row-
weight. However, in practice our ratio
dt−1,t
dt,t
approaches that of the Corollary
3.16 for t = dimF2 (〈Im(ε)〉).
So, in order to point out the distribution of the ranks of our matrices we
provide a bound on the number of the full-rank matrices.
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Lemma 3.18. Let c = 2m, let n = cb (n ≥ k) and z = dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉).
The total number of admissible vectors in 〈Im(ε)〉 is cb. The average number
ξ(h) of admissible vectors in a subspace generated by h linearly independent
admissible vectors is
ξ(0) = 0, ξ(1) = 1, ξ(2) = 2,
ξ(h) = h+ (2h − h− 1)( c
b
2z
), 3 ≤ h ≤ z − 1
Proof. An admissible vector can be any vector having weight 1 in any of the
b components. There are cb such vectors.
The whole space 〈Im(ε)〉 contains 2z vectors. The subspace B generated
by h independent vectors (V1, . . . , Vh) contains 2
h vectors. Of these, h are
(V1, . . . , Vh) themselves (admissible) and one is the zero vector (non-admissible).
So B contains 2h − h− 1 “other” vectors. To estimate how many of these
are admissible, we simply multiply 2h−h−1 by the ratio admissible vectors
all vectors
= c
b
2z
.
Therefore, our average contains h + (2h − h− 1) cb
2z
admissible vectors
Theorem 3.19. Let c = 2m, let n = cb (n ≥ k ≥ 1) and z = dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉).
(1) The number of (k × n)-matrices having rank k can be estimated by the
following formulas
ρ(k, k) =
∏
1≤i≤k
(
cb − ξ(i− 1))
i.e.
ρ(1, 1) = cb, ρ(2, 2) = cb(cb − 1), ρ(3, 3) = cb(cb − 1)(cb − 2),
ρ(k, k) = cb(cb − 1)(cb − 2)
∏
4≤i≤k
(
cb − (i− 1)− (2i−1 − i) c
b
2z
)
, k ≥ 4
(2) The number of (k × n)-matrices having rank k − 1 can be estimated by
the following recursive formula
ρ(2, 1) = cb, ρ(3, 2) = ρ(2, 2)ξ(2) + ρ(2, 1)(cb − ξ(1)) = 3cb(cb − 1),
ρ(4, 3) = ρ(3, 3)ξ(3) + ρ(3, 2)(cb − ξ(2))
ρ(k, k−1) = ρ(k−1, k−1)ξ(k−1)+ρ(k−1, k−2)(2z−2k−2) c
b
2z
, k ≥ 5,
Proof. (1) In order for a (k × n)-matrix to have rank k, the rows must
be linearly independent. The first row can be any vector having weight
1 in any of the b component. There are cb such vectors, so ρ(1, 1) = cb
(i.e. cb is the total number of the admissible vectors). The second row
must be independent of the first row. That means it cannot be equal
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to the first row. There are (cb − 1) choices for the second row and thus
ρ(2, 2) = cb(cb−1). The third row cannot be equal to one of the previous
rows. But also, in our representation, it is impossible that two admissible
vectors add to another admissible vector. Then we have (cb − 2) choices
for the third row, so ρ(3, 3) = cb(cb − 1)(cb − 2).
On the other hand, if we add three or more admissible vectors we may
get another admissible vector. As a consequence, if we are considering
the i-th row, we must discard on average ξ(i− 1) vectors and so we can
choose only among cb − ξ(i− 1).
(2) The set of the (k × n) matrices having rank exactly k − 1 is the disjoint
union of two sets:
a) those having the first k − 1 rows linearly independent (and so the
k-th row dependent on the previous k − 1 rows);
b) those having the first k − 1 rows linearly dependent (and so these
rows have rank k − 2 and the k-th row is independent from them).
Therefore, the number of (k × n) matrices having rank exactly k − 1 is
obtained adding the following two values
a) the number of (k − 1)× n matrices having rank k − 1 multiplied by
the number of all possible choices for the dependent row.
b) the number of (k − 1)× n matrices having rank k − 2 multiplied by
the number of all possible choices for the independent row.
• The number of (k−1)×n matrices having rank k−1 is ρ(k−1, k−1),
for k ≥ 2. In case k = 2, we have ρ(1, 1) = cb.
• The number of all possible choices for the dependent row is ξ(k − 1)
for k ≥ 2; if k = 2, the possible choice is exactly one, since the only
second row we can choose is the first rows.
• The number of (k−1)×n matrices having rank k−2 is ρ(k−1, k−2)
and it makes sense for k ≥ 3. When k = 2 we have to consider a
matrix having exactly one row and with rank 0, so it is the zero row,
but the zero row is not an admissible vector. In other words, when
we have only two rows, the set in b) is empty. In case k = 3, we have
ρ(2, 1) = cb, since the second row has to be equal to the first one.
• The number of all possible choices for the independent row is
(2z − 2k−2)( cb
2z
) and it is true for k ≥ 5. For k = 3, we must choose
a third row different from the first two. The first two are equal and
so we have cb − 1 choices. For k = 4, we must choose a fourth row
outside the space generated by the first three, but only two of the
first three are distinct ans so we have cb − 2 choices.
Putting altogether we obtain our formula.
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3.3 Application to AES
Because of the AES structure, we assign the following values to the pa-
rameters we have previously introduced. Let V = (F2)
r be our starting vector
space with r = 128 and W = (F2)
s, s > 128. We need to establish s. We
consider the quotient F256 ∼= F2[x]/〈m〉, where m = x8+x4+x3+x+1 ∈ F2[x]
is the AES-polynomial. So m = 8. According to the previous section, we con-
sider ε′ : F28 → (F2)256 by means of a primitive element γ of F256, which is a
root of the primitive polynomial 10 n = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 ∈ F2[x], and we
define our parallel map ε : V → W , with r = mb = 128 and s = 2mb = 4096,
as
ε(v1, . . . , v16) = (ε
′(v1), . . . , ε′(v16)).
We have that dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉) = 4081, by Proposition 3.13.
A tipical round function of the AES cryptosystem consists of the composition
of two parallel maps (AddRoundKey and SubBytes operations) and two non-
parallel maps (ShiftRows and MixColumns operations). We view the SubBytes
(and AddRoundKey) operation as a parallel map π
π : (F28)
16→ (F28)16
(y1, · · · , y16) 7→ (π1(y1), · · · , π16(y16))
where yi ∈ F28 and πi ∈ Sym(F256), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 16. In the SubBytes case,
each component πi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, is composition of inversion opera-
tion and an affine map; in the AddRoundKey case, we have a sum with the
round-key. By the Theorem 1.5 we recalled in the first section, we have that
Sym(F256) = 〈ax+ b, x254〉, where a, b ∈ F256. We note that a parallel map can
be linearized using elementary results from Representation Theory.
Moreover, we claim that ShiftRows is linear over (F2)
4096 and that Mix-
Columns is not linear over (F2)
4096, as follows.
First of all, we recall the map that describes the ShiftRows operation:
sh : (F28)
16 → (F28)16
(y1, y2, · · · , y16) 7→ (y1, y6, y11, y16, y5, y10, y15, y4, y9, y14, y3, y8, y13, y2, y7, y12).
Denoting by y = (y1, · · · , y16), we note that
ε(y) = (ε′(y1), ε′(y2), ε′(y3), ε′(y4), ε′(y5), · · · , ε′(y16))
and
ε(sh(y)) = (ε′(y1), ε′(y6), ε′(y11), ε′(y16), ε′(y5), · · · , ε′(y12)).
The map sh is linearly extendible because
∑
i∈I ε(b
i) = 0 clearly implies the
following equality
∑
i∈I ε(sh(b
i)) = 0.
10 note that n 6= m; we could not use m because it is not primitive.
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According to Lemma 3.6, it is possible to construct the linear map
Ash : (F2)
4096 → (F2)4096
and so the ShiftRows operation is linear over (F2)
4096.
Now, we show that the MixColumns operation is not linear over (F2)
4096
using the following counterexample.
Example 3.20. Let w1, w2, w3, w4 ∈ W such that w1 + w2 + w3 = w4:
w1=(ε
′(γ1), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w2=(ε
′(γ1), ε′(0), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w3=(ε
′(0), ε′(0), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w4=(ε
′(0), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0)).
Now, we apply the MixColumns operation MC to each vector w1, w2, w3, w4
obtaining the following
MC′(w1) = (ε
′(γ1), ε′(γ3), ε′(0), ε′(γ51), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
MC′(w2) = (ε′(γ3), ε′(γ51), ε′(γ3), ε′(γ51), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
MC′(w3) = (ε′(γ1), ε′(γ3), ε′(γ51), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
MC′(w4) = (ε′(γ3), ε′(γ51), ε′(γ1), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
where
V
MC

ε //W
MC′

V
ε //W
.
Then we have that MC′(w1) +MC′(w2) +MC′(w3) is
(ε′(γ3), ε′(γ51), ε′(0) + ε′(γ3) + ε′(γ51), ε′(γ1), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0)).
The third component of the previous vector is a sum in (F2)
256 and it has
weight equal to 3. So, the vector MC′(w1) +MC′(w2) +MC′(w3) is an element
of the admissible space but it is a non-admissible vector.
Therefore, MC′(w4) = MC′(w1 + w2 + w3) 6= MC′(w1) + MC′(w2) + MC′(w3)
and so the MixColumns is not linear over W . It means that the extension of
MC is not linearly extendible.
Remark 3.21. If all the AES operations were parallel maps, it would be possible
to linearize the “full” cryptosystem because the set of the parallel maps is a
group with respect to the composition operation.
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3.4 Application to PRESENT
As for AES, we assign the right values to our parameters, according to
PRESENT’s structure. Let V = (F2)
r be our starting vector space with r = 64,
and W = (F2)
s with s > 64. We consider ε′ : F24 → (F2)16 and we define our
parallel map ε : V →W , with r = mb = 64 and s = 2mb = 256, as
ε(v1, . . . , v16) = (ε
′(v1), . . . , ε
′(v16)).
We note that dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉) = 241 (see Proposition 3.13).
A typical round function of the PRESENT cryptosystem consists of the com-
position of two parallel maps (addRoundKey and sBoxLayer operations) and
one non-parallel map (pLayer operation). The addRoundKey (and sBoxLayer)
operation is a parallel maps π
π : (F24)
16→ (F24)16
(t1, · · · , t16) 7→ (π1(t1), · · · , π16(t16))
where πi ∈ Sym(F16). In the sBoxLayer case, each component πi (1 ≤ i ≤ 16)
is given by the table in Subsection 1.7; when π is the addRoundKey operation,
we have only a bitwise sum with the round-key.
Moreover, it is easy to see that pLayer is not linear over (F2)
256.
Example 3.22. Let w1, w2, w3, w4 ∈ W such that w1 +w2 +w3 = w4 and let
ζ, η, ϑ, ξ, µ be distinct non-zero elements in F24 . Suppose that
w1=(ε
′(ζ), ε′(ζ), ε′(0), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w2=(ε
′(ζ), ε′(0), ε′(ζ), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w3=(ε
′(0), ε′(0), ε′(ζ), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0))
w4=(ε
′(0), ε′(ζ), ε′(0), ε′(0), ε′(0), · · · , ε′(0)).
Now, we apply the pLayer transformation pL to each vector w1, w2, w3, w4
obtaining the following
pL′(w1) = (ε′(η), ε′(0)3, ε
′(η), ε′(0)3, ε
′(η), ε′(0)3, ε
′(η), ε′(0)3)
pL′(w2) = (ε′(ϑ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ϑ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ϑ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ϑ), ε′(0)3)
pL′(w3) = (ε′(ξ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ξ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ξ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(ξ), ε′(0)3)
pL′(w4) = (ε
′(µ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(µ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(µ), ε′(0)3, ε
′(µ), ε′(0)3)
where ε′(0)3 means (ε
′(0), ε′(0), ε′(0)). Then, we have that
pL′(w4) = pL′(w1+w2+w3) 6= pL′(w1)+pL′(w2)+pL′(w3) = (ε′(η)+ε′(ϑ)+ε′(ξ), . . .),
where the first component has weight 3, and so the pLayer is not a linear
operation over W .
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Remark 3.23. As in the AES case, if all the PRESENT’s operations were
parallel maps, it would be possible to linearize the “full” cryptosystem be-
cause the set of the parallel maps is a group with respect to the composition
operation.
3.5 Application to SERPENT
Let V = (F2)
r be our starting vector space with r = 128. In order to
identify the value of r ≥ s, where W = (F2)s, we have to consider the map
ε′ : (F24)→ (F2)24 .
We define our parallel map ε : V →W with r = mb = 128 and s = 2mb = 512
as
ε(v1, . . . , v32) = (ε
′(v1), . . . , ε′(v32)).
Note that dimF2(〈Im(ε)〉) = 2mb− (b− 1) = 481.
The components of a typical round function are the parallel S-box, the affine
transformation described in Subsection 1.6 and the translation with the round
key. Obviously, key translation and S-box are parallel maps of type
π : (F24)
32→ (F24)32
(t1, . . . , t32) 7→ (π1(t1), . . . , π32(t32))
where πi ∈ Sym(F24).
Similarly to what was done for AES and PRESENT, we could provide a
counterexample to show that the linear transformation of SERPENT is not
linear over (F2)
512.
4 Results on a larger embedding
In this section we provide another specific embedding that can be seen as
an improvement of the former (2). Also the new embedding can be applied to
AES, PRESENT and SERPENT. In Subsection 3.2 we considered Ω = V as a
vector space and we found an embedding V →֒ W such that the S-boxes and
the key-additions become linear. However, in this way we lost the linearity
of the Mixing Layer λ and so here we make a larger embedding where the
linearity of λ is recovered, without losing the linearity of the key addition. We
do lose the linearity of the S-boxes, but their non-linearity is probably kept
low.
Starting from the setting we described in the previous section, we con-
sider our parallel map ε : (F2m)
b → ((F2)2m)b defined as ε(v1, . . . , vb) =
(ε′(v1), . . . , ε′(vb)).
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Now, let M be a matrix in GL((F2)
mb) and let t be its order, Mt = idV .
Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb and let W = (F2)
s be
the vector space with dimension s = 2mbt. The space embedding α : V → W
we propose in this section is defined as follows
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(Mt−1v)). (5)
From now on, α denotes the map in (5). Thanks to Proposition 3.13, we can
easily prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb
and let W = (F2)
s be the vector space with dimension s = 2mbt. Let α be as
in (5). Then we have
2mb− (b− 1) ≤ dimF2
(〈Im(α)〉) ≤ (2mb− (b− 1))t
Proof. By Proposition 3.13, dimF2
(〈Im(ε)〉) = 2mb− (b− 1). Since
{(ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(Mt−1v)) | v ∈ V } ⊂ {(ε(v1), . . . , ε(vt)) | v1, . . . , vt ∈ V },
then
dimF2
(〈Im(α)〉) ≤ (2mb− (b− 1))t.
On the other hand, considering the projection of {(ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(Mt−1v))}
on the first component (the first b bytes), the lower bound follows immediately,
again considering Proposition 3.13.
We can further improve Proposition 4.1 for byte-oriented Mixing Layer.
Proposition 4.2. Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = mb
and let W = (F2)
s be the vector space with dimension s = 2mbt. Let M ∈
GL((F2m)
b). Let α be as in (5). Then we have
dimF2
(〈Im(α)) ≤ 2mbt− (bt− 1)−mb(t− 1)
Proof. Let T = 〈Im(α)〉. For any w1, w2 ∈ W , let w1 ·w2 denote their scalar
product. It is sufficient to show that there exist (bt− 1) +mb(t− 1) elements
in T⊥ that are linearly independent, where T⊥ = {w ∈ W | w · t = 0, ∀t ∈ T}
is the orthogonal space of T (or the “dual” of T , in coding theory notation).
In fact, this means
dimT⊥ ≥ (bt− 1) +mb(t− 1)
and since dimT = dimW − dim T⊥, our result could follows.
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Consider the following matrix product with M = (ai,j)

a11 a12 · · · · · · a1b
a21 a22 · · · · · · a2b
...
...
...
...
...
ab1 ab2 · · · · · · abb




v1
v2
...
vb

 =


v′1
v′2
...
v′b


Obviously, v′1 =
∑b
i=1 via1i.
Let S ′ be a subspace of (F2)m such that dim(S ′) = m− 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ b,
let Si = {β ∈ (F2m) | βa1i ∈ S ′}. We note that Si is a subspace and that
{ b∑
i=1
via1i | vi ∈ Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ b
}
= S ′
and that |Si| = |S ′| = 2m−1. There exists a bijection via orthogonality between
the sets S = {S < (F2)m| dim(S) = m− 1} and {S⊥ < (F2)m| dim(S⊥) = 1};
their cardinality is obviously 2m− 1. We can choose a linear basis for S ∪{0},
i.e. S ∪ {0} = 〈e⊥1 , . . . , e⊥m〉. Therefore, each row of M generates m linearly
independent elements of T⊥.
Two relations coming from two different rows are independent, since the ma-
trix M has full rank, for a total of mb relations.
Now, we construct the elements of the orthogonal space that correspond
to the relations induced by the rows ofM. We are considering the case (v,Mv)
and we observe that
b∑
i=1
via1i = v
′
1 = (Mv)1 (6)
where vi ∈ Si. Since ε′(Si) ⊂ (F2)2m , we consider wi =
∑
ℓ∈ε′(Si) ℓ where
w(wi) = |ε′(Si)| = 2m−1 and wi ∈ (F2)2m . The element of T⊥ coming from (6)
and S is
(w1, . . . , wb, w
′
1, . . . , 0, . . . 0)
where w′1 =
∑
ℓ∈ε′(S′) ℓ. Clearly, m− 1 similar elements come from (6) and S.
If we consider the relations given by the h-th row of M, i.e.
∑b
i=1 viahi = v
′
h,
we obtain the following elements
(w1, . . . , wb, 0, . . . , w
′
h, . . . , 0, . . . 0).
At this point, we have constructed the mb elements of the orthogonal space
corresponding to the previous relations.
Instead of considering (v,Mv), since clearly M(Miv) = Mi+1v, we can ap-
ply the previous construction to each pair (Miv,Mi+1v), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 2,
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obtaining the corresponding elements
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(i−1)
, w1, . . . , wb︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
, 0, . . . , w′h, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
bt−(i+1)b
) (7)
We have found exactly mb(t− 1) vectors in T⊥. Since the pairs (Miv,Mi+1v)
and (Mjv,Mj+1v) with i 6= j involve different bytes, the relations given by
(Miv,Mi+1v) are independent from those given by (Mjv,Mj+1v). Then we
have mb(t−1) independent relations (i.e. linearly independent elements of the
orthogonal space).
Thanks to Proposition 3.13, we have exactly (bt − 1) further relations,
corresponding to elements in T⊥ of type
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
bt−(k+1)
) (8)
with 1 ≤ k ≤ bt.
The vectors (7) and (8) form clearly a linearly independent set.
As we have done in previous section, we can construct the following matrix.
Let D be a subset of the plaintext set M such that |D| = dimF2 (〈Im(α)〉).
Let ai ∈ D, 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|. We construct the (|D| × 2mbt)-matrix D such that
the i-th row is the image of the map α applied to the plaintext ai ∈ D, for
i ∈ {1, · · · , |D|}:
D =


α(a1)
α(a2)
...
α(a|D|)

 =


ε(a1) ε(Ma1) · · · ε(Mt−1a1)
ε(a2) ε(Ma2) · · · ε(Mt−1a2)
...
...
...
...
ε(a|D|) ε(Ma|D|) · · · ε(M t−1a|D|)

 .
Remark 4.3. We expect the rank of this matrix to have a behavior similar to
that of matrix H (3), see Remark 3.17. Our experiments confirm this.
Let G˜ be the set of parallel maps π˜ : (F2m)b → (F2m)b, such that, for any
1 ≤ j ≤ b, π˜j(x) = ax+ c, with a 6= 0, c ∈ F2m (a and c do not depend on j).
Let G¯ be the set of parallel maps π¯ : (F2m)b → (F2m)b, such that, for any
1 ≤ j ≤ b, π¯j(x) = x+ dj, with dj ∈ F2m .
Note that both G˜ and G¯ are subgroups of Sym((F2m)b) and we define G as
G =
〈
G˜, G¯,M
〉
< Sym((F2m)
b).
The following result holds:
Proposition 4.4. Let σ be either an element of G˜ or an element of G¯, then
there exists Aσ : W →W which is linear.
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Proof. We want to apply Lemma 3.6 and so we must only show that σ is
linearly extendible. Let {vi}i∈I ⊂ V such that
∑
i∈I α(v
i) = 0, we have to
prove that
∑
i∈I α(σ(v
i)) = 0. Note that
∑
I α(v
i) = 0 is equivalent to∑
I
(
ε′(vi)1, . . . , ε′(vi)b, ε′(Mvi)1, . . . , ε′(Mvi)b, . . . , ε′(Mt−1vi)1, . . . , ε′(Mt−1vi)b
)
= 0.
Then we have the following system Sj for any 1 ≤ j ≤ b
Sj =


∑
I ε
′(vij) = 0∑
I ε
′((Mvi)j) = 0
...∑
I ε
′((Mt−1vi)j) = 0.
Using Lemma 3.12, we have that Sj is equivalent to S
′
j
S ′j =


|{ℓ | vℓj = vij}| is even ∀i ∈ I
|{ℓ | (Mvℓ)j = (Mvi)j}| is even ∀i ∈ I
...
|{ℓ | (Mt−1vℓ)j = (Mt−1vi)j}| is even ∀i ∈ I.
Suppose σ ∈ G˜ which means that σ(v) = σ(v1, · · · , vb) = (σ1(v1), · · · , σb(vb))
where σi(vi) = avi + c for any 1 ≤ i ≤ b and a 6= 0, c ∈ F2m .
Since M is linear, we have
(Mhσ(vℓ))j =(M
h(avℓ1 + c, · · · , avℓb + c))j
=(aMhvℓ +Mh(c, · · · , c))j
=(aMhvℓ)j + (M
h(c, · · · , c))j
= a(Mhvℓ)j + c¯,
where c¯ is a constant independent of ℓ.
We have that, ∀i ∈ I and for any 1 ≤ h ≤ t − 1, |{ℓ | (Mhvℓ)j = (Mhvi)j}|
is even and so that |{ℓ | a(Mhvℓ)j + c¯ = a(Mhvi)j + c¯}| is even. Thanks to
Lemma 3.12, our thesis follows.
Suppose now that σ ∈ G¯, i.e. σ(v) = v + d for some d ∈ V . Since
(Mhσ(vℓ))j =(M
h(avℓ + d))j
=(Mhvℓ)j + (M
h(d))j
=(Mhvℓ)j + d¯,
where d¯ is a constant independent of ℓ and |{ℓ | (Mhvℓ)j = (Mhvi)j}| is even,
we have that
|{ℓ | (Mhvℓ)j + d¯ = (Mhvi)j + d¯}|
is even. By Lemma 3.12, our thesis follows.
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4.1 Application to AES
Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = 128 and let M :
V → V be the MixingLayer of AES, that is, the composition of ShiftRows and
MixColumns. Since M has order equal to 8 (i.e.M8 = idV ), the map α : V →W
we propose is defined as follows
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(M7v)), (9)
where W = (F2)
s is the vector space with dimension s = 2mbt = 215 and ε is
the map defined in Subsection 3.3: ε : (F2)
128 → (F2)4096.
Let T = 〈Im(α)〉 with α in (9). We can easily determine dim(T ).
Fact 4.5. In the AES case we have
dimF2(T ) = 2
mbt− (bt− 1)−mb(t− 1) = 31745.
Proof. Let λ = 2mbt− (bt− 1)−mb(t− 1). By computational experiments,
we have found a (λ × 2mbt) full rank matrix for the α representation in the
AES case. Which means dimF2 T ≥ λ. Thanks to Proposition 4.2 we conclude
that dimF2 T = λ.
We note that the group
G =
〈
G˜, G¯,M
〉
< Sym((F28)
16).
contains all the permutations of the AES-round function, except notably for
the S-box operation.
Proposition 4.6. Let M be the MixingLayer. Then α is a space embedding
with respect to G =
〈
G˜, G¯,M
〉
.
Proof. According to Proposition 4.4, there exists a linear map Aσ :W →W
in case σ is G˜ or G¯. We note that the previous result is independent from M.
Let M be the MixingLayer M. Since α(vi) = (ε(vi), ε(Mvi), . . . , ε(M7vi)) and
α(Mvi) = (ε(Mvi), ε(M2vi), . . . , ε(M8vi))
= (ε(Mvi), ε(M2vi), . . . , ε(vi))
α(Mvi) is a permutation of α(vi). Obviously, we have that
∑
i∈I α(v
i) = 0
implies
∑
i∈I α(Mv
i) = 0.
With a fixed K, the encryption φK is the composition of AddRoundKey,
Subbytes and MixingLayer. So the only part of φK which is not linear (with our
map α) is the SubBytes operation.
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4.2 Application to PRESENT
Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = 64 and let M : V → V
be the pLayer of PRESENT. Since M3 = idV , the map α : V →W we propose
is defined as follows
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv), ε(M2v)), (10)
where W = (F2)
s is the vector space with dimension s = 2mbt = 768. Let α
be as in (10) and T = 〈Im(α)〉. Also in this case it is possible to prove (with
a computation) that dimF2(T ) = 2
mbt− (bt− 1)−mb(t− 1) = 593
With a fixed K, the encryption φK is the composition of addRoundKey,
sBoxLayer and pLayer. So the only part of φK which is not linear (with our
map α) is the sBoxlayer operation.
4.3 Application to SERPENT
Let V = (F2)
r be a vector space with dimension r = 128 and let M : V →
V be the affine transformation of SERPENT. Since the order ofM is greater 11
than 2116, it is huge and impractical to consider the map α : V → W
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(M2
80
v), . . . ). (11)
since W = (F2)
s would have s = 2mbt > 24 · 32 · 2116 = 2125, making the rank
computation impossible with nowadays technology.
5 Attack strategies
In this paper we do not report on successful attacks on (full versions of) the
AES or other well-known ciphers. It is true that we have implemented several
attacks aiming at distinguishing AES from random permutations, presented in
some talks, and that we have collected some data indicating that our approach
is likely to succeed. Yet, our data do not provide an overwhelming statistical
evidence for the full cipher versions. Therefore, in this section we sketch some
attack strategies that we have followed, without giving full details.
The most difficult task in assessing the success of one of our embeddings
is, by far, to estimate the non-linearity decrease of the cryptosystem. For
example, a rigorous determination of the s-extendibility (Subsection 6.1) ap-
pears completely out of reach. The only methods we can use to estimate the
non-linearity fall are ”a posteriori” checks on linear dependences.
We have implemented only chosen-plaintex attacks, either with single-key
or with related keys. In the single-key scenario, we proceed in three steps:
11 to be precise it is 110329570561973845861261474090270635, as computed directly
with MAGMA.
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(1) we choose a set S of N (31745 × 215)-matrices, with rows taken from T
(Fact 4.5);
(2) we encrypt all matrices in S (row by row) with a given key and compute
their ranks;
(3) we compare their rank distribution with the expected rank distribution
for a set of N random (31745× 215)-matrices, with rows taken from T ,
aiming at distinguishing the two distributions;
(4) to validate the distinguishing statistical test, we also create sets of N
random (31745 × 215)-matrices (in T ) and we compare them with the
expected distribution, aiming at not distinguishing them.
In the related-key scenario we proceed similarly. Let nk be the number of
related keys:
(1) we choose a set S of N (31745× 215)-matrices, with rows taken from T ;
(2) we encrypt all matrices in S (row by row) with all keys and compute
their ranks;
(3) we compare their rank distribution with the expected rank distribution
for a set of NNk random (31745× 215)-matrices, with rows taken from
T , aiming at distinguishing the two distributions;
(4) to validate the distinguishing statistical test, we also create sets of Nnk
random (31745 × 215)-matrices (in T ) and we compare them with the
expected distribution, aiming at not distinguishing them.
Apart from the obvious difference in the dealing of the single-key/related-
key mechanism, the two scenarios are very similar, since in both we hope to
spot a significant deviation by looking at ranks. Matrix ranks do depend on the
linear dependences of the rows and are much easier to compute and compare,
so they are cheap indicators for the non-linearity behavior (see Marsaglia’s
test, e.g. [Sot98],[NIS00]).
On the other hands, since a great deal of row dependences influence the rank,
as indicators they are noisy and force us to collect a huge number of samples.
To maximize the effect on the rank of our embeddings, we need to choose S
with a very specific rank distribution, e.g. with matrices of extremely low rank
(while keeping all rows distinct).
A report on some experimental results can be found in [RSB10].
6 Further remarks and other results
The first subsection contains some results on how our representation could
achieve a weaker notion of linearity.
In Subsection 6.2 we report other thinkable representations, that unfortu-
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nately are impractical. The main objective in these constructions is to identify
the right compromise between computational feasibility and quantity of infor-
mation that can be obtained.
Then, in Subsection 6.3 we prove the fact, using classical and easy argu-
ments, that it is unlikely to embed the AES cipher into a linear cipher, unless
one uses a huge-dimensional vector space (and so this embedding is useless in
practice).
6.1 On a weaker notion of linearity
The results in this section are jointly with L. Maines and the proofs are
contained in her Master’s thesis [Mai09] (see also [MRS10]), supervised by the
second author.
The main goal sought in Section 3.1, Section 3.2, Section 4, and Section 6.2 is
to find practical embedding of (F2)
128 into a larger space where all components
of the round function become linear. This is impossible, as shown in Section
6.3, but what we achieve in Section 4 is an embedding where the non-linear
maps are “not so far” from linear maps. There are many notions of “non-
linearity”, but none of them can be easily computed in our setting. When we
say “not so far from linear”, we mean that these functions behave with matrix
ranks in a way similar to that of linear maps, as discussed in Section 5.
However, we have been able to introduce a new non -linearity notion, that
we call s-extendibility (Definition 6.1). We are not able to apply it in the
embedding
α : v → (ε(v), ε(Mv), · · · , ε(M7v)). (12)
but we can apply it 12 to
α : v → (ε(v), ε(Mv)).
and so our definition and our results (the main results of this section is Theo-
rem 6.6) should be seen as a step forward the complete understanding of the
surviving non-linearity in (12).
Definition 6.1. Let V = (F2)
r and W = (F2)
s, with s > r. Let σ ∈ Sym(V )
and α be an injective map α : V → W . We say that σ is s-extendible (via
α) if ∀{vh}1≤h≤s ⊂ V we have
s∑
h=1
α(vh) = 0 ⇐⇒
s∑
h=1
α(σ(vh)) = 0.
Remark 6.2. If v1 = v2 and v3 = v4, then ∀α and ∀σ we have
α(vi) + α(v2) + α(v3) + α(v4) = 0
12 under specific conditions on M
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and
α(σ(vi)) + α(σ(v2)) + α(σ(v3)) + α(σ(v4)) = 0.
So if we test the 4-extendibility of σ only on these sets of vectors, we will find
that any σ is 4-extendible. We call these vectors “coupled vectors”.
We note that if σ is s-extendible ∀s ∈ N, then σ is linearly extendible, ac-
cording to Definition 3.4. Moreover, any linear map is s-extendible for all s. A
random map is a 2-extendible but (with high probability) it is not s-extendible
for any s ≥ 4. Therefore, any 4-extendible map can be considered closer to a
linear map. We would like to have results on our embedding concerning the
s-extendibility of maps. A first result in this direction is obtained using the
space embedding
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv)), (13)
where M is a (n× n)-matrix with entries in F2m , as we are going to explain.
Definition 6.3. Let i, j, x, y, α, β, · · · ∈ F2m and M an (n × n)-matrix with
entries in F2m
M =


m11 m12 . . . m1n
m21 m22 . . . . . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
mn1 . . . . . . mnn

 .
The vectors w1, w2, w3, w4 ∈ (F2m)2n are 4-related vectors if they can be
permuted in order to have the following form:
1 2 . . . n + 1 . . . 2n
1 w1, (i, x, . . . m11i+m12x+ . . . , . . . mn1i+mn2x+ . . . )
2 w2, (i, y, . . . m11i+m12y + . . . , . . . mn1i+mn2y + . . . )
3 w3, (j, x, . . . m11j +m12x+ . . . , . . . mn1j +mn2x+ . . . )
4 w4, (j, y, . . . m11j +m12y + . . . , . . . mn1j +mn2y + . . . )
Four related vectors w1, . . . , w4 are admissible vectors α(v1) = (ε(v1), ε(Mv1)),
α(v2) = (ε(v2), ε(Mv2)), α(v3) = (ε(v3), ε(Mv3)), α(v4) = (ε(v4), ε(Mv4))
such that
ε(v1) + ε(v2) + ε(v3) + ε(v4) = 0 ,
but we do not know the sum ε(Mv1) + ε(Mv2) + ε(Mv3) + ε(Mv4).
Let σ be a parallel maps over (F2m)
2n. The image of 4-related vectors via
σ can be seen as
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1 2 . . . n+ 1 . . . 2n
1 w1, (σ(i), σ(x), . . . m11σ(i) +m12σ(x) + . . . , . . . mn1σ(i) +mn2σ(x) + . . . )
2 w∗2, (σ(i), σ(y), . . . m11σ(i) +m12σ(y) + . . . , . . . mn1σ(i) +mn2σ(y) + . . . )
3 w∗3, (σ(j), σ(x), . . . m11σ(j) +m12σ(x) + . . . , . . . mn1σ(j) +mn2σ(x) + . . . )
4 w∗4, (σ(j), σ(y), . . . m11σ(j) +m12σ(y) + . . . , . . . mn1σ(j) +mn2σ(y) + . . . )
Definition 6.4. 4-related vectors w1, . . . , w4 are totally 4-related if
w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 = 0.
Definition 6.5. Given (x, y, z, a, b, c) ∈ N6 and an (n × n)-matrix M, we
say that (x, y, z, a, b, c) fits M if the following sums of elements of det(M) are
non-zero:
• the sums having a number of elements equal to
x∑
i=0
(
n− c
i
)(
n− b
x− i
)(
b− i
y
)
x!y!
x∑
i=0
(
n− b
i
)(
n− c
x− i
)(
c− i
z
)
x!z!
y∑
i=0
(
n− a
i
)(
n− c
x− i
)(
c− i
z
)
y!z!
when z = 0, x 6= 0, y 6= 0 when y = 0, x 6= 0, z 6= 0 when x = 0, y 6= 0, z 6= 0
• the sums having a number of elements equal to
x∑
i=0
y∑
j=0
(
n− c
i
)(
n− b
x− i
)(
n− a
j
)(
(n− c)− i
y − j
)(
c− (x− i)− j
z
)
x!y!z!
when x 6= 0, y 6= 0, z 6= 0.
The main result of this section is the next theorem that gives sufficient
conditions on M in order to make all σ : V → V into 4-exendible maps.
Theorem 6.6. Let M be an (n× n)-matrix, with entries in F2m such that:
(1) det(M) 6= 0;
(2) all the k × k minors are non-zero (0 < k < n);
(3) all sextuple (x, y, z, a, b, c) such that
• 0 < a, b, c ≤ n;
• a+ b+ c = 2n;
• a ≥ b ≥ c;
• 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ n;
• x+ y + z = n;
• x < a, y < b, z < c;
fit M.
Then any 4-related vectors are totally related if and only if they are coupled.
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Thanks to Theorem 6.6 and Remark 6.2, we have the following
Corollary 6.7. In the hypothesis of Theorem 6.6, any map is 4-extendible.
6.2 Other embeddings of this kind
We can also build other embeddings similar to those described in previous
sections. The main objective in these constructions is to identify the right
compromise between computational feasibility and quantity of information
that can be obtained. In Section 3.2, we constructed the embedding ε that
has been useful to make linear the S-box maps which are the classical non-
linear maps of a cryptosystem. We had to abandon the linearity ofMixColumns
(for AES) and the pLayer (in case of PRESENT). In order to use some more
information about the MixColumns (or the pLayer for PRESENT), we have
considered the embedding given in Section 4:
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(Mv), . . . , ε(Mt−1v)),
where M is the full Mixing Layer. The strength of this enbedding is that we
can exploit the low order of M to force the linearity of M. The disadvantages
are that we have lost some computational efficiency and that the S-box is
non-linear again (but with a lower non-linearity).
For AES, we considered also the embedding given by
α(v) = (ε(v), ε(MC(v)), . . . , ε(MC3(v))),
since the order of the MixColumns is equal to 4 and the MixColumns operation
was the only to be non-linear in Section 3.2. Unfortunately, in this context
both the ShiftRows and the parallel maps are non-linear and so we put aside
this idea.
Although the following two embeddings could provide a lot of information
about a cryptosystem,
• α(v) = (ε(v), ε((M◦Sbox)v), . . . , ε((M◦Sbox)t−1v)) (t = o(M◦Sbox))
• α(v) = (ε(v), ε((γλσk)v), . . . , ε((γλσk))t−1v)) (t = o(γλσk))
they are very impractical, since the order of (M◦Sbox) and of (γλσk) is huge.
6.3 On complete linearizations of AES
Let C be any block cipher such that the plain-text spaceM coincides with
the cipher space. Let K be the key space. Any key k ∈ K induces a permuta-
tion τk onM. Since M is usually V = (F2)n for some n ∈ N, we can consider
τk ∈ Sym(V ). We denote by Γ = Γ(C) the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by
all the τk’s. Unfortunately, the knowledge of Γ(C) is out of reach for the most
important block ciphers, such as the AES [Nat01] and the DES [Nat77]. How-
ever, researchers have been able to compute another related group. Suppose
A. Rimoldi, M. Sala, I. Toli 39
that C is the composition of l rounds (the division into rounds is provided in
the document describing the cipher). Then any key k would induce l permuta-
tions, τk,1, . . . , τk,l, whose composition is τk. For any round h, we can consider
Γh(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V ) generated by the τk,h’s (with k varying in
K). We can thus define the group Γ∞ = Γ∞(C) as the subgroup of Sym(V )
generated by all the Γh’s. Obviously, Γ ≤ Γ∞ . Group Γ∞ is traditionally
called the group generated by the round functions with independent sub-keys.
This group is known for some important ciphers, for example we have
Proposition 6.8 ([SW08],[Wer02]).
Γ∞(AES) = Alt((F2)128).
It is very likely (and it is common belief among researchers) that ΓAES =
Γ∞(AES) = Alt((F2)128). Assuming this, we discuss in this section the possi-
bility of viewing ΓAES as a subgroup of GL(V ) with V of small dimension. In
Cryptography it is customary to present estimates as powers of two, so our
problem becomes to find the smallest ℓ such that ΓAES can be linearized in
GL((F2)
2ℓ). A classical proof is given in [Wag76] that ℓ = 128. We feel de-
sirable to obtain a result with a simpler proof. Our estimate is weaker than
Wagner’s, but strong enough to show the linearization infeasibility.
There are two obvious ways to show that a finite group A cannot be
contained (as isomorphic image) in a finite group B. The first is to show that
|A| > |B|, the second is to show that there is η ∈ A such that its order is
strictly larger than the maximum element order in B. Subsection 6.3.1 presents
our result using the first approach and we show that ℓ ≥ 67, which is more than
enough to ensure the infeasibility of the linearization attack. This subsection’s
argument is completely elementary. Subsection 6.3.2 present our result using
the second approach and we show again that ℓ ≥ 67. It is interesting that,
although here some more advanced argument is needed (results in number
theory), we reach the same estimate.
6.3.1 First approach
In this subsection we show that the order of Alt((F2)
128) is strictly larger
than the order of GL(V ), with V = (F2)
266 , so that ℓ ≥ 67.
We begin with showing a lemma.
Lemma 6.9. The following inequality holds
2(2
7)19 < 2128! < 2(2
7)20 .
Proof. Let n = 27, we have to show 2n
19
< 2n! < 2n
20
. We first show that
2n
19
< 2n!. The following inequality holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2 and 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n−i
1
2n−i
≥ 1
2n−i+1 − h . (14)
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Clearly
2n! > 2n
19 ⇐⇒ 2n(2n − 1)! > 2n · 2n19−n
⇐⇒ (2n − 1)(2n − 2)! > 2n19−n · 2
n − 1
2n − 1 .
We apply (14) with i = 1 and h = 1 and so we must prove
(2n − 1)(2n − 2)! > 2n19−n · 2
n − 1
2n−1
,
i.e. (2n − 2)! > 2n19−n−(n−1). We use the same inequality for all 2 ≤ h ≤ 2n−1
and we obtain that we must verify (2n−1 − 1)! > 2n19−n−2n−1(n−1). Then we
proceed by applying (14) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and all 1 ≤ h ≤ 2n−i, so that
we need only to prove
(2n−(n−1) − 1)! ≥ 2n19−n−
∑n−1
i=1 2
n−i(n−i) .
In other words, we have to prove
1 > 2n
19−n−∑n−1i=1 2n−i(n−i), that is, 0 > n19 − n−
n−1∑
i=1
2n−i(n− i). (15)
But a direct check shows that the right-hand size of (15) holds when n = 27.
We are left to demonstrate the following inequality: 2n! < 2n
20
.
We proceed by induction for 2 ≤ n ≤ 27. In this range a computer computation
shows that
n20 + 2nn+ 2n < (n + 1)20. (16)
When n = 2, we have 22! < 22
20
. Suppose that 2n! < 2n
20
and n ≤ 27.
We have to prove that 2(n+1)! < 2(n+1)
20
. Since 2n+1! = (2n · 2)! = 2n!(2n +
1) · · · (2n + 2n), we have
2n!(2n+1) · · · (2n+2n) < 2n20+n+1·(2n+2) · · · (2n+2n) ≤ 2n20+2n(n+1) = 2n20+2nn+2n
and, applying (16), we get 2n
20+2nn+2n < 2(n+1)
20
.
Then the claimed inequality 2n+1! < 2(n+1)
20
follows.
Our result is contained in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.10. Let V = (F2)
2ℓ with ℓ ≥ 2. If G < GL(V ), with G
isomorphic to Alt((F2)
128), then ℓ ≥ 67.
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Proof. If G < GL(V ), then |G| ≤ |GL(V )|. But |Sym((F2)128)| = 2128! >
22
133
thanks to Lemma 6.9 and so
|G| = |Alt((F2)128)| = |Sym((F2)
128)|
2
>
22
133
2
= 22
133−1 > 22
132
> |GL((F2)266)| .
Therefore, ℓ = 66 is not large enough.
Remark 6.11. We could improve the previous bound to ℓ ≥ 68 by using the
finite version of the Stirling fomula:
nlog2n−nlog2(e) ≤ log2(n!) ≤ nlog2n−nlog2(e)+log2n,
(n
e
)n
≤ n! ≤ n
(n
e
)n
.
6.3.2 Using the order of the elements
In this subsection we compare the maximum order of elements in the two
groups Alt((F2)
128) and GL((F2)
2ℓ). We use permutations of even order. We
denote by o(σ) the order of any permutation σ, with σ ∈ Alt((F2)128) or
σ ∈ GL((F2)2ℓ).
The best available result for GL((F2)
2ℓ) is given by the following theorem
Theorem 6.12 ([Dar08]). Let σ ∈ GL((F2)N), with o(σ) is even and N ≥ 4.
Then
o(σ) ≤ 2(2N−2 − 1) = 2N−1 − 2.
Moreover, there is σ ∈ GL((F2)N ) whose order attains the upper bound.
Proof. It comes directly from Theorem 1 in [Dar08], with p = q = 2 and
N ≥ 4 (so point (a) and (b) do not apply).
As regards the order of the elements in Alt((F2)
128), we would like to use
the following theorem
Theorem 6.13 ([DM96]). Let ν ≥ 3 and n = 2ν. Then Alt((F2)ν) contains
an element η of order (strictly) greater then e
√
(1/4)n lnn.
The previous theorem is the special case of Theorem 5.1.A at p.145 in
[DM96] when q = 2.
In order to be able to compare the two estimates coming from Theorem
6.12 and Theorem 6.13, we rewrite Theorem 6.13 as follows, in order to have
o(η) even. Our proof is an easy adaption of the proof contained in [DM96].
Theorem 6.14. Let ν ≥ 7 and n = 2ν. Then Alt((F2)ν) contains an element
η with o(η) > e
√
(1/4)n lnn and o(η) even.
Proof. Let z be a prime number such that 4+
∑
3≤p≤z p ≤ n , where the sum
runs over (distinct odd) prime numbers. Then Alt((F2)
ν) contains an element
ηz = σσ
′σ3 · · ·σp · · ·σz such that: σ and σ′ are transpositions, σp is a cycle
of length p, and all cycles {σ, σ′, σ3, . . . , σz} act on disjoint subsets of (F2)ν .
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In other words, the non-trivial cycles of ηz are two transpositions and some
cycles with length 3, . . . , z. As a consequence, the order of ηz is 2
∏
3≤p≤z p.
We are going to show that there is z ∈ N such that
4 +
∑
2<p≤z
p ≤ n and (ϑ(z))2 > 1
4
n ln(n)
where ϑ(z) = ln(o(ηz)) = ln(2) +
∑
2<p≤z ln(p); in the following we consider
ϑ∗(z) = ϑ(z)− ln(2) =∑2<p≤z ln(p).
Since n ≥ 27, we note that 4 +∑2<p≤19 p = 79 < 128 ≤ n.
Let f(z) = z
ln(z)
. Since f(z) is an increasing function for real z > e, in case
z is real and z ≥ 19, we have that
f(4) ln(4) + f(3) ln(3) = 7 < f(19) ln(3) ≤ f(z) ln(3) (17)
and so we can write (if z ≥ 19 and z ∈ R)
4 +
∑
2<p≤z
p= f(4) ln(4) +
∑
2<p≤z
f(p) ln(p)
= f(4) ln(4) + f(3) ln(3) +
∑
3<p≤z
f(p) ln(p)
<f(z) ln(3) +
∑
3<p≤z
f(z) ln(p)
=
∑
2<p≤z
f(z) ln(p) = f(z)
∑
2<p≤z
ln(p) = f(z)ϑ∗(z).
We shall choose z¯ ≥ 19 such that f(z¯)ϑ∗(z¯) = n. Such a z¯ exists because
f(19)ϑ∗(19) < 100 < n and f(z)ϑ∗(z) is an increasing function assuming all
values.
Since ϑ∗(z) > z/2 for all z ≥ 19, we have
n =
z¯ϑ∗(z¯)
ln(z¯)
<
2(ϑ∗(z¯))2
ln(2ϑ∗(z¯))
=
4(ϑ∗(z¯))2
2 ln(2ϑ∗(z¯))
= f(4(ϑ∗(z¯))2) .
However we also have f(n ln(n)) < n. Since f is an increasing function, this
shows that n ln(n) < 4(ϑ∗(z¯))2 < 4(ϑ(z¯))2. It is now enough to consider z˜ as
the largest prime smaller than z¯.
Now, we compare the estimate from Theorem 6.12 and Theorem 6.13.
Take n = 2128 and η ∈ Alt((F2)128) such that o(η) ≥ et (o(η) even), where
t =
√
(1/4)n lnn =
√
(1/4)2128 ln(2128).
Since
et = e
√
2126128 ln 2 = e
√
2133 ln 2 = (e
√
2 ln 2)2
66
,
by replacing e with 2log2 e, we obtain
et = (2(log2 e)
√
2 ln 2)2
66
= 22
66(log2 e)
√
2 ln 2 = 22
66ε,
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where ε ∈ R is circa 1.69. According to Theorem 6.14, the order of η is at
least o(η) ≥ e266ε. If Alt((F2)128) ⊂ GL((F2)N), we then need the the smallest
N such that o(η) ≤ (2N−1− 2) (Theorem 6.12). In other words we have to see
when the following inequality holds
o(η) = 22
66ε ≤ 2N−1 − 2. (18)
We observe that
• if N = 266, then (18) is false, since 2266ε > 2266 > 2266−1 − 2;
• if N = 267, then (18) is true, since 2266ε < 2266(1.7) < 2267−1 − 2.
Therefore, we need at least ℓ ≥ 67 in order to embed Alt((F2)128) ⊂
GL(V ), which is exactly the same value as in Proposition 6.10.
Remark 6.15. It is shown in Landau [Lan03] that the maximum order of an
element in Sym((F2)
ν) is asymptotic to e
√
n lnn as n → ∞ (with n = 2ν).
Assuming this, we observe that we could slightly improve the value of ℓ we
need to ℓ ≥ 68, which is the same as Remark 6.11.
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